Greek Texts & Translations

39.6You have heard from the witnesses the manner in which our father enrolled us; I shall now show to you that, as the defendant did not choose to abide by this enrollment, it was both just and necessary for me to bring suit. For I am surely not so stupid nor unreasonable a person as to have agreed to take only a third of my father's estate (though the whole of it was coming to me), seeing that my father had adopted these men, and to be content with that, and then to engage in a quarrel with my kin ^note about a name, were it not that for me to change mine would bring great dishonor and a reputation for cowardice, while for my opponent to have the same name as myself was on many accounts impossible.

39.7To begin with (assuming that it is best to mention public matters before private), in what way will the state give its command to us, if any duty is to be performed? The members of the tribe will, of course ^note, nominate us in the same way as they nominate other people. Well then; they will bring forward the name of Mantitheus, son of Mantias, of Thoricus ^note if they are nominating one for choregus ^note or gymnasiarch ^note or feaster of the tribe ^note or for any other office. By what, then, will it be made clear whether they are nominating you or me? 39.8You will say it is I; I shall say it is you. ^note Well, suppose that after this the Archon summons us, or any other magistrate, before whom the case is called. We do not obey the summons; we do not undertake the service. Which of us is liable to the penalties provided by law? And in what manner will the generals enter our names, if they are listing names for a tax-company? or if they are appointing a trierarch? Or, if there be a military expedition, how will it be made clear which of us is on the muster-roll? 39.9Or again, if any other magistrate, the Archon, the King-Archon, the Stewards of the Games, makes an appointment for some public service, what sign will there be to indicate which one of us they are appointing? Are they in heaven's name to add the designation “son of Plangon,'' if they are entering your name, or add the name of my mother if they are entering mine? But who ever heard of such a thing? or by what law could this special designation be appended, or anything else, accept the name of the father and the deme? And seeing that both of these are the same great confusion must result. 39.10Again, suppose Mantitheus, son of Mantias, of Thoricus should be summoned as judge, ^note what should we do? Should we go, both of us? For how is it to be clear whether he has summoned you or me? Or, by Zeus, suppose the state is appointing to any office by lot, for example that of Senator, ^note that of Thesmothet, ^note or any of the rest; how will it be clear which one of us has been appointed?—unless some mark shall be attached to the tablet, ^note as there might be to anything else; and even then people will not know to which of us two it belongs. Well then, he will say that he has been appointed, and I shall say that I have. 39.11The only course left is for us to go into court. So the city will order a court to be set up for each of the cases; and we shall be cheated of the fair and equal right, that the one chosen by lot shall hold office. Then we shall berate each other, and he who shall prevail by his words will hold office. And in which case should we be better off—by trying to rid ourselves of our existing resentments, or by arousing fresh animosities and recriminations? For these must of necessity result, when we wrangle with one another about an office or anything else. 39.12But suppose again (for we must examine every phase of the matter), one or the other of us persuades the other, in case he is chosen, to yield the office to him, and so obtains the appointment? What is this but one man drawing lots with two tablets? Shall it, then, be permitted us to do with impunity a thing for which the law appoints the penalty of death? “Why, certainly, for we should not do it,” you may say. I know that, at least so far as I am concerned; but it is not right that some persons should even be liable to this penalty, when they need not be.

39.13Very well; but in these cases it is the state that is injured: what harm does it do me individually? Observe in what serious ways I am harmed, and consider if there be anything in what I say. Indeed the wrong done to me is far more grievous than what you have heard. You all know, for instance, that he was intimate with Menecles during his lifetime, and with his crowd, and that he now associates with others no better than Menecles, and that he has cherished the same ambitions, and desires to be thought a clever fellow ^note; and, by Zeus, I dare say he is.